The Effects of Gerrymandering on Partisanship
I’ll be doing a research paper on Gerrymandering for one of my courses this semester. I will briefly outline my thesis and main points without going too far into the details. I will probably post a more sophisticated version of the argument when I have finished the research.
Gerrymandering is the major cause of partisanship in this era of extremely divisive partisanship. For those unacquainted with the topic, gerrymandering is the redrawing of congressional districts to deliberately give an advantage to an incumbent or a political ideology.
Primary elections replace general elections in gerrymandered districts in terms of importance for election. The real contest is in the primary election, because the majority of the electorate has been deliberately drawn to include one party. Nomination is tantamount to election.
Who, then, is likely to be nominated in gerrymandered districts? It stands to reason that the person who most nearly represents the chosen ideology for the district has the best chance of being nominated, and thus elected to the seat. Liberal candidates stand a better chance in liberal districts. Conversely, conservative candidates stand a better chance in conservative districts.
The general election does not provide a moderating effect because there is no viable opposition party. The party in control of the district has a high probability of winning the seat regardless of who they nominate. There is no incentive for a party to compromise and nominate moderate candidates.
The consequence is the radicalization of the district’s seat. Moderate candidates usually hold some positions that are not completely consistent with the overall political ideology of the district. Therefore, the most likely candidate to win the gerrymandered seat is the more radical ideologue.
Congressmen, once elected to their seat, have no incentive to compromise with the opposing party, and every incentive to avoid compromise. Generally speaking, it is in the incumbent’s interest to keep his constituency happy with his actions. The electorate rewards ideological consistency with the only thing they have – reelection. As David Mayhew shows in Congress: The Electoral Connection, congressmen are rewarded for position-taking rather than for successful policymaking. Therefore, incumbents have every reason to hold firm on their positions, and a disincentive to compromise.
The end result of all of this gerrymandering is a divisive political system. The more districts that are drawn to reflect ideology, the more radical seats will appear in congress – especially the House of Representatives with its smaller districts. A higher number of radical seats means more sparring in congress over legislation. The more sparring in congress, the more mobilization of ideology – both inside and outside of congress. This increased mobilization and sparring is what we know as divisive partisanship. Welcome to the Era of Partisanship.

October 16, 2009 - 8:26 pm
Gerrymandering in Northern Ireland would be a good 'Worked example' if you will.